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Abstract 
 
This paper provides new empirical evidence about the impact of various technological policies upon firms’ innovative 
behaviour.  We take into consideration the role of policies for innovative activities and we focus on their interaction. 
While supply-side policies such as R&D subsidies and tax credits have been both extensively  discussed in the literature 
and empirically  investigated, the analysis of innovative public procurement is a growing  trend in the literature, which 
still lacks robust empirical  evidence. In this paper, we replicate the existing results on supply-side policies, surmise 
fresh empirical evidence on the outcome of innovative public procurement, and address the issue of possible interaction 
among the various tools. When controlling for the interaction with other policies, supply-side subsidies cease to be as 
effective as reported  in previous studies and innovative public procurement seems to be more effective than other tools. 
The preliminary evidence suggests that technology  policies exert the highest impact when different  policies interact. 
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1. Introduction 
 
R&D subsidies  are a form of innovation policy that has been extensively  analysed in the literature. One of the 
most debated issues has been whether  R&D subsidies displace private efforts or, on the contrary, favour them due 
to some form of complementary  relationships.   The more recent literature  seems to converge towards a substantial 
rejection of the presence of a crowding-out  effect in R&D subsidies. Since the seminal paper by Almus and Czarnitzki 
(2003), a widespread empirical method to approach the issue has been the use of a quasi-experimental setting in which 
the outcome variable is the innovative  performance and the treatment is whether firms receive subsidies or not. In 
order to control for the selection bias, subsidized firms are compared with a control  group that has been previously 
made comparable through the implementation  of non-parametric matching techniques. Most of these studies point in 
the direction of substantial complementarity of R&D subsidies and private R&D investment. However, this specific 
empirical method in use deserves further analysis. In quasi-experimental settings, the researcher runs the risk of 
omitting non-observable variables which can nevertheless influence the results.  When these variables are randomly 
distributed among the subsidized firms and the control group, they do not bias the results. However, when the omitted 
variables change with the level of the subsidies, they can be a possible source of a confounding  effect. The literature 
is very well aware of this problem and in the next section we mention various papers that try to cover the majority of 
possible sources of confounding factors.  A second possible confounding  factor, which has not been discussed at all 
in the literature, consists of the presence of potential hidden treatments. In the case of a specific technology policy,  a 
hidden treatment might be represented by a confounding  variable that is not a firm’s characteristic, but an additional 
strategic option that can be implemented by the policy maker to obtain the same results. If this event is not taken into 
account, it is impossible to conclude that the observed innovative outcome is due to the use of R&D subsidies or, by 
contrast, to the implementation of other non-observed technology policies or the interaction of a policy  mix. 
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More specifically this paper considers R&D tax credits and innovative  public procurement  as possible  hidden 
treatments. While R&D tax credits have been extensively analysed (Eisner et al., 1984; Mansfield, 1986; Hall, 1993; 
Hall and Van Reenen, 2000), there is a growing  trend in the literature on technology policy about the role of innovative 
public procurement as a possible complement or alternative policy to supply-side policies (Edler and Georghiou, 2007). 
In the case of R&D subsidies and tax credits scholars have mostly focused on the impact upon the innovative input; 
conversely, the literature on innovative  public procurement has focused on the effect of innovative public procurement 
upon both innovative input and innovative  output such as innovative  turnover.  Despite various theoretical accounts, 
the empirical evidence is still very fragmented. In this paper, we surmise that R&D subsidies, R&D tax credits, and 
innovative public procurement are tools of the technology policy mix that can contextually  affect a firm’s innovative 
performance. For this reason, in order to evaluate the effect of either policy a researcher should implement  a method 
able to disentangle the various effects. 
 
In this paper we aim to test the contextual impact of R&D subsidies, R&D tax credits, and innovative public 
procurement upon a firm’s private R&D investment.  Hence, we make three points. First, by taking into account 
innovative public procurement  and R&D tax credits, we control the past results on R&D subsidies for a possible 
hidden treatment such as alternative technology policies.  Second, we provide empirical  evidence on the effectiveness 
of innovative  public procurement. Finally,  we discuss the interaction of the various policies and call for further research 
on the policy mix rather than on policy in isolation. 
In the next section we discuss the state of the art. In section 3.2 we present the data and methodology.   The 
empirical results and conclusion follow. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1. Supply-side technology policy: R&D subsidies and tax credits 
The impact of public R&D subsidies upon innovation  outcome has been broadly  discussed in the literature, yet 
there is still puzzling evidence about the nature of the interaction of R&D subsidies with private investment. The cen- 
tral question is whether public support displaces private efforts, simply adds to them, or even favours their increase. 
The argument concerning whether substitutability,  additionality  or complementarity exists between R&D subsidies and 
private R&D investments  has long been debated in the literature.  David et al. (2000) survey the empirical literature 
and find mixed evidence for various levels of aggregation of the unit of analysis. On the one hand, some studies at the 
firm level suggest that public R&D subsidies crowd out private R&D investment (Shrieves, 1978; Carmichael, 1981; 
Higgins and Link, 1981), while others indicate the existence of a possible reinforcing  mechanism between the two of 
them (Holemans and Sleuwaegen, 1988; Link, 1982; Antonelli, 1989). Capron (1992) and Capron and De La Pot- 
terie (1997) show that the effect might depend on various covariates that are idiosyncratic  to the specific subsidies 
programmes such as country  and sector of eligibility, to the firm and market size and to the intensity of the subsi- 
dies. Garcia-Quevedo  (2004) discusses the studies reviewed  in these surveys and counts 37 articles presenting some 
evidence of complementarity,  and 24 showing  a net effect of substitutability, while the remaining 15 do not produce 
statistically significant results. Moreover, he empirically  rejects the hypothesis that the ambiguity in the literature can 
be due to differences in the methodological tools. Additionally David et al. (2000) discuss the methodological  issues 
and hold the difficulty of dealing with the problem of endogeneity in such a context  responsible for this ambiguous 
empirical support. 
 
This [mutual interdependence of public and private R&D expenditures]  may present an issue for econo- 
metric analysis, either because of simultaneity  and selection bias in the funding process, or because there 
are omitted latent variables that are correlated with both the public and private R&D investment decisions 
(David et al., 2000, p. 509). 
 
Similarly, Busom (2000) suggests the possible endogeneity of R&D subsidies and tries to deal with the issue of 
selection bias with a structural  approach whereby  she first estimates the probability  of a firm taking part in a public 
R&D subsidies programme and only thereafter does she estimate the private R&D efforts to test for the presence of 
the crowding-out effect. Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) address the issue of selection  bias as well: the challenge is to 
make use of a statistical technique that allows for a counter-factual  analysis comparing the innovative  behaviour of 
firms that receive R&D subsidies with the hypothetical situation in which  the same firms did not receive them. As it is 
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not possible to observe the same firm in both states of the world, the first-best solution would be to run an experiment 
on a group  of subsidized firms vs. a control group of not-subsidized firms and test whether there is a significant 
difference in the mean of a particular  proxy for innovative behaviour. This procedure requires the two groups to be 
perfectly randomized, i.e. the innovative  behaviour of a firm does not correlate with the probability  of the firm to 
be in a specific  group. However,  when a real randomized experiment is not at hand and the researcher is forced to 
use non-experimental  data, the existence of a selection bias precisely undermines this requirement. In such a case, the 
solution suggested by Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) consists of dealing with the data as in a quasi-experimental setting, 
in which, although initially the control  group cannot be used as a base line because of the lack of randomization, it 
could be made comparable with the treated group by manipulating it with various techniques. Almus and Czarnitzki 
(2003) choose to implement propensity score matching to assign each subsidized firm to a control  firm exhibiting the 
greatest similarity in terms of various characteristics. Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) conclude by showing a reinforcing 
effect between public R&D subsidies and private R&D efforts. 
 
Their result  has been corroborated  by several empirical  studies that control for the selection bias in a quasi- 
experimental setting á la Almus and Czarnitzki. Among  others, González and Pazó (2008) indicate in a sample of 
Spanish manufacturing  firms both the absence of the crowding-out  effect and, under certain circumstances, the pres- 
ence of complementarity. Using the same dataset, González et al. (2005) suggest that the lack of R&D subsidies can 
even restrain firms from investing in R&D at all. Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) show the additionality of R&D subsidies 
for Western- and Eastern Germany. Czarnitzki  et al. (2004) conclude that R&D tax credits increase the overall R&D 
engagement for a sample of Canadian firms.  Goerg and Strobl (2007) find that the absence of additionality depends on 
the size of the R&D grants and on the country of origin: evidence relating to Irish firms suggests that additionality in 
R&D subsidies holds for small grants, while large grants might crowd out private investment. These results hold only 
for Irish firms and not for foreign ones. Czarnitzki  et al. (2007) show for a sample of Finnish and German firms that 
R&D subsidies affect more innovative  output measures such as the number of patents rather than R&D expenditure. 
Aerts and Schmidt (2008) reject the hypotheses of the crowding-out effect in a comparisons between firms in Germany 
and the Flanders. 
 
All in all, although the evidence is not yet conclusive, it seems that when controlling for the selection bias in 
quasi-experimental  settings, the presence of a crowding-out  effect has to be rejected and, under certain conditions, 
there is empirical support for the claim that R&D policies positively  impact upon private investments.1   However, a 
quasi-experimental framework is not immune to possible flaws. The first shortcoming is the presence of extraneous 
variables, that is, unobserved firm characteristics that influence other independent variables.  If they affect both the 
subsidized firms and the control group, extraneous variables do not usually bias the results, although they might create 
some noise and increase the variance.  However,  the case in which an extraneous variable varies with the level of the 
treatment variable in a systematic way induces a serious drawback in the analysis, because it introduces a confounding 
factor. This is precisely the reason why the results vary when additional  firm characteristics are introduced, for instance 
the size of the grants (Goerg and Strobl, 2007), the size of the firm, or the sector of activity (González et al., 2005). An 
even more serious type of confounding factor occurs when an extraneous variable varies in a systematic way with the 
outcome variables. This kind of confounding factor can be seen as a hidden treatment (Huston, 1997). The problem 
is very well known in clinical research, when typically various compounds are administered to patients  as a cure for 
the same disease (Thall et al., 2000), and in the alternative medicine/integrative medicine framework, which studies 
the interaction of alternative and integrative medicine with the administration of standard compounds (Caspi and Bell, 
2004). 
 
In this article, we claim that a crucial  confounding  factor that has not been taken into account in the previous 
literature is the presence in a system of innovation of other technology policies designed to stimulate private R&D. 
If the major source of selection bias derives from public institutions, which decide on the eligibility for a subsidies 
programme depending on specific firm characteristics (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003), it is reasonable to assume that 
the same criteria might also be adopted for eligibility for R&D incentives programmes other than R&D subsidies or 
 
 
1 Many other studies can be cited which  can corroborate these hypotheses in a non quasi-experimental  setting as well, such as Hussinger  (2008) 
and Blanes and Busom (2004), which still control in various ways for selection bias. 
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that being selected for a subsidies programme  increases a firm’s probability of being elected as a recipient  of another 
technology policy. If this is the case, not controlling for the interaction with other technology policies can result in an 
over-estimation of the impact of R&D subsidies. The candidates for such a confounding  policy could be either other 
supply-side technology policies or demand-side ones. On the supply side, scholars have been analysing the impact of 
R&D tax credits. Since the literature has extensively  discussed the impact of R&D tax credits, in this paper we briefly 
summarize the results. Scholars have focused on the impact R&D tax credits, considered as a reduction  in the price of 
R&D, upon private R&D investment (Eisner et al., 1984; Mansfield, 1986; Hall, 1993; Hall and Van Reenen, 2000). 
Since private R&D activity is assumed to be below the optimal level because of appropriability issues, a tax credit 
should increase the equilibrium private R&D expenses by reducing at the margin the cost of R&D, while the marginal 
benefit remains unchanged.  Hall and Van Reenen (2000) conduct a reviews  of various studies and suggest that a 
unitary elasticity of R&D expenses to R&D tax credits can be a good "ballpark  figure" (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000, 
p.467), although they contextually warn about both the high degree of heterogeneity of these results across sectors and 
countries and the changing policy conditions over time. Following Hall (1993), most of the literature directly estimates 
the demand function for R&D. As discussed for R&D subsidies, more recently a quasi-experimental  setting has also 
been employed for assessing the impact  of tax credits (Corchuelo Martínez-Azúa and Martínez-Ros, 2009; Czarnitzki 
et al., 2011). For instance, Czarnitzki  et al. (2011) consider the impact of tax credits on firms’ innovative performance 
by looking at a sample of Canadian firms and show that tax credits might lead to additional innovative output. An 
interesting point made by Corchuelo Martínez-Azúa  and Martínez-Ros (2009) is that tax credits are employed by firms 
that make use of other public R&D support. This evidence corroborates the hypothesis that the effect of a single policy 
cannot be considered in isolation, but the analysis should take into account possible forms of hidden treatments. 
A second source of hidden treatment can arise from demand-side technology  policies  such as innovative  public 
procurement, that is a government  demand for innovative  products and services, which might directly or indirectly 
stimulate private R&D (Edler and Georghiou, 2007). David et al. (2000) have already hypothesized, but not investi- 
gated, the relevance of the possible interaction of these technology  policies: 
 
government-funded industrial R&D projects would be seen as carrying  less (private)  risk, especially  as 
much of it is devoted to "product innovation" for "output" that eventually is to be sold back to the govern- 
ment procurement agency (David et al., 2000, p. 498). 
 
Innovative public procurement therefore seems to be a suitable suspect for investigation as a possible demand-side 
hidden treatment in the test for the presence of complementarity, additionality,  and substitutability of R&D subsidies. 
 
2.2. Demand-side technology policy: Innovative public procurement 
Innovative public procurement is a growing  trend in the debate about technology  policy and deserves a detailed 
discussion. An early work in this area by Lichtenberg (1988) tests the effect of noncompetitive governmental contracts 
upon company-sponsored R&D expenditures. He estimates that $1 increase in governmental  sales induces a 9.3 cent 
increment in private R&D, while $1 increase in non-governmental  sales induces an increment of only 1.7 cent. This 
result suggests not only that public  procurement has a positive effect on a firm’s propensity  to engage in R&D, but also 
that the demand pull effect is larger for public procurement than for other private contracts. Similarly Geroski (1990) 
points out the role of public procurement in creating demand for new products and process, making an already-existing 
demand visible, and providing  a minimal  market size in the early stage of an innovation.  It clearly emerges that the 
discussion of innovative public procurement is intrinsically linked with the debate about the role and magnitude of 
demand  as a source of innovation.  The demand pull hypotheses, extensively studied in the 1960s and in the 1970s, 
was somehow left aside after the disrupting critique by Mowery  and Rosenberg (1979) and Dosi (1982), which point at 
both theoretical and empirical flaws of the study in the area. A slow, but over time consistent work about the demand- 
side approach (Von Hippel, 1988; Rogers, 1995; Malerba et al., 2007; Fontana and Guerzoni, 2008) gave a new twist 
to this literature stream. The central idea of the new wave of demand studies is that the influence of demand upon 
innovation should be considered as a mixture  of two elements (Guerzoni, 2010). On the one hand, the size of a market 
can be used as a proxy  for the demand. In this case, a larger demand will create more incentives for R&D investment, 
since it increases the expected profits  from the innovation. On the other hand, the demand can be considered  as a 
source of information from users, which, by providing  producers with knowledge about the market  needs, reduce 
the uncertainty linked with the development of new products. Focusing on a sample  of small- and medium-sized 
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enterprises in several industries and European countries (Fontana and Guerzoni, 2008) show that the former effect is 
especially true for process innovation,  while the latter applies for product innovation. 
Contextually, the resurrection of the demand-side also took place both in the literature about industrial policy with 
the work by Edler and Georghiou (2007) "Public procurement and innovation.  Resurrecting the demand side" and at 
the policy level (Aho et al., 2006; Georghiou, 2006; EU, 2010). Edler and Georghiou (2007) set up a very general 
framework of discussion, which grounds the need for demand-oriented innovation policy in market failures as it is 
done for supply-oriented policy. 
The growing interest in the topic raises the issue of the theoretical definition of innovative public procurement. The 
literature proposes several taxonomies and different labels defining this concept2 . The most widespread definition,  as 
introduced by Edquist and Hommen (2000b) and recently further developed by Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia 
(2012), considers public procurement of innovation  as occurring when ‘a public agency places an order for a product 
or a system  which does not exist at the time, but which could probably be developed within a reasonable  period’. 
This form of purchasing is usually opposed to ’regular public procurement’ which occurs when a public agency buys 
ready made simple products such as pens and paper, requiring no R&D (Edquist and Hommen, 2000b). Although this 
definition has the major advantage of neatly distinguishing these two categories of procurement, recent works (Uyarra 
and Flanagan, 2010; Rolfstam, 2012) both highlight  its potential limitations  and stress the fact that it constrains the 
innovative  procurement scope to the activities that follow a formal  tender process. The reason for considering innova- 
tive behaviour after the procurement order lies in the possibility of observing the direct effect of public procurement 
on firms’ innovative  behaviour; however, ignoring  the phase before the order could hide the indirect  impact of the 
procurement policy. As the demand-pull  literature  suggests (Guerzoni,  2010), a firm’s decision to introduce  a new 
product or service rather than a standardized one is affected by the size and the degree of sophistication of the potential 
demand. Innovative public procurement  can be seen as a way to enhance both the size and the sophistication  of the 
demand in a given  context.  Indeed, a procurement  agency can create or enlarge a market and provide  firms willing 
to invest in a specific sector with a sufficient level of expected profits. Secondly, in the procurement context, a public 
agency may be considered as a prospective  customer with a general preference for more or less innovative products, 
services or systems. In many cases, the government has been an early and crucial purchaser in technological intensive 
industries (Dalpé et al., 1992; Slavtchev and Wiederhold,  2011; Mazzucato, 2011). The firm’s innovative activity 
might therefore be crucially influenced by the nature of public demand even if a formal order is yet to come; this is es- 
pecially true if the public agency is one of the key players in a specific  sector such as in the military sector. Along this 
line of reasoning, Mazzucato (2011) argues that public spending might have a beneficial influence on entrepreneurs’ 
“animal spirits”, by raising their expectations about the growth prospect in an economy or specific sector. Considering 
this variegated set of studies, in this work we refer to a broader definition  of innovative public procurement and we 
consider it as the purchasing activities  carried out by public agencies that may lead to innovation, even if indirectly or 
as a by-product. 
 
Despite the theoretical and policy attention paid to the issue, the empirical  evidence about the effect of innovative 
public procurement on innovation outcome is rather fragmented and mostly limited to case studies (Edquist  and Hom- 
men, 2000a; Rolfstam, 2009; Flanagan et al., 2011; Brammer and Walker, 2011; Uyarra and Flanagan, 2010). Notable 
exceptions are Aschhoff and Sofka (2009) and Slavtchev and Wiederhold (2011). Slavtchev and Wiederhold (2011)’s 
work is a very sophisticated paper that departs from the traditional  test of public policy at the firm level. Indeed they 
develop a Schumpeterian model of growth in order to make predictions about the role of the sectoral composition and 
intensity of public procurement in the economy growth path. An empirical  test with panel data at the sectoral level 
of the US economy suggests that the model predictions are correct and public procurement leads to higher returns 
in industries with higher technology opportunities.  Aschhoff and Sofka (2009)’s paper is an exemplary work in the 
tradition of evaluating technological policy at the firm level with survey data in the same spirit as the articles  men- 
tioned above about R&D subsidies. Aschhoff and Sofka (2009) test the role of various policies on a cross-section of 
1149 German firms that responded to the survey "Mannheim Innovation Panel" in 2003. Based on self-reported data, 
they are thus able to compare the impact on the innovative output of firms proxied by their innovative turnover, which 
is defined  as the share of turnover with market novelties.  They find robust evidence for a positive  impact of public 
 
 
2 Expressions like "‘public technology procurement"’ and "‘public procurement of innovation"’ are used to refer to very similar phenomena. For 
further  discussion  see Rolfstam (2012). 
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procurement using a latent class tobit regression, which might partly control for the selection bias of the sample. The 
value of their paper is twofold; first, it is the only recent empirical work on procurement with a large cross-sectoral 
dataset. Second, to our knowledge, it is the only analysis that links firms’ innovative behavior with different technol- 
ogy policy mixes and not with a single policy only. Indeed, as already pointed out in the previous section, it might 
be the case that R&D subsidies are explicitly linked with a subsequent procurement (Lichtenberg,  1988; David et al., 
2000) or that a firm can both apply for subsidies and participate in tenders for public procurement. 
 
Summing up, the work on R&D subsidies and tax credits and the latter by Aschhoff  and Sofka (2009) each tackle 
one side of the problem only. The former manages to develop a robust technique to isolate a causal effect of a policy 
tool on firms’ innovative behaviour, it signals the potential risk of a crowding-out  effect of public subsidies on private 
investment, but it succeeds in ruling it out empirically. However, works on the evaluation of R&D subsidies have 
omitted to consider other policies, which can potentially interact with R&D. Given the quasi-experimental setting of 
these pieces of research, this omission might lead to an overestimation  of the impact of R&D grants on innovation. 
The positive impact of R&D subsidies on private investment might be partially  or even totally due to the contextual 
influence of other policies such as R&D tax credits and innovative public procurement and, thus, not to the R&D grants 
only. Aschhoff and Sofka (2009) following the new trend of demand-oriented technology policies have the merit of 
including both policies in their analysis. However, their econometric approach obliges them to cut from the dataset 
non-innovative firms which, on the contrary should be the first candidate for an adequate control  sample. Moreover 
they limit their analysis to the output of innovation activities and therefore they do not provide any insights into the 
impact of innovative public procurement on private investment in R&D. 
 
On this basis, in this paper we try to gain the best of two worlds. We aim to test the impact of technological policies 
on a firm’s innovative behaviour when both supply-side policies, namely R&D subsidies and tax credits, and innovative 
public procurement are taken into account and we perform the analysis in a multi-treatment quasi-experimental setting. 
Our finals goals are (1) to test the robustness of results on supply-side policies when innovative public procurement 
are also taken into account, (2) to provide new empirical evidence on the evaluation of innovative public procurement, 
and finally (3) to pay a special attention to the interaction of those policies.  In the next section, we describe the data 
available to accomplish this task and the methods we apply. The results and conclusions follow. 
 
 
3. Data and method 
 
3.1.  Method 
In order to analyse empirically the impact of the different technology policies, the paper exploits the fact that only 
a small portion of the 5238 firms included in our dataset received subsidies for innovative activities, innovative public 
procurement, or tax credits(table A.1). This allows the design of a quasi-experimental framework in which policy tools 
are considered as treatment variables and firms are assigned to the treatment, rather than to the control group, on the 
basis of their participation in different public programmes. However, since we are analysing non-experimental data in 
an “experimental spirit”(Angrist and Pischke, 2008), two main problems may arise. 
 
In the first place we are aim to evaluate the effect of three different treatments (technology policy tools) that are not 
assigned to specific subgroups of different individuals (firms), nor are perfect substitutes (Aschhoff and Sofka, 2009) 
from the individuals’ perspective.  Hence, in the dataset, we may find firms in distinct conditions: firms receiving 
subsidies only, firms winning innovative public procurement contracts only, firms benefiting from tax credits only, 
firms receiving two or more treatments simultaneously and firms that are not involved at all in any of these programmes. 
Trying to estimate the impact of each of the policies without taking into account the possible interactions with the 
others, may clearly lead to procedural confounding effects as we discussed above. 
In order to tackle this issue, we exploit the information  at our disposal in the dataset that will be presented in the 
next section, and design ten different treatments out of the three innovation policy tools possibly adopted: 
 
1. Policy_Subsidies 
2. Policy_Procurement 
3. Policy_Tax Credits 
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4. Policy_Subsidies_only 
5. Policy_Procurement_only 
6. Policy_Taxcredit_only 
7. Policy_Sub_Tax 
8. Policy_Sub_IPP 
9. Policy_IPP_Tax 
10. Policy_All 
 
The first three treatments do not take into consideration the potential simultaneity of the programmes and are 
hence exposed to the procedural confounding problem defined above. Though they might be biased, the reason for 
recovering estimates of their effect on firms’ innovative behavior is dual. On the one hand, the retrieved estimates will 
be used as terms of comparison to check effectively for the existence of a confounding  effect. On the other hand, since 
they will be recovered in a similar setting to the one proposed in the literature (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Aerts and 
Schmidt, 2008), we will compare the significance, direction and magnitude of the results with the evidence provided 
so far of the role of different technology policies upon firms’ innovative activity. 
Treatments 4, 5 and 6 are explicitly designed to eliminate the potential  hidden treatment problem,  since they 
consider  each policy in isolation but control for potential simultaneous treatments.  The existence of a significant 
difference between the estimates recovered for the latter treatments with respect to treatments 1-3 would imply that 
the procedural confounding produced by hidden treatments does indeed play a role and that the estimation recovered 
for the first three treatments, as those obtained in similar settings in the literature, should not be uncritically  trusted. 
Finally  treatments 7 to 10 take into account any possible interaction between the three policies. Thus, they will allow us 
to evaluate the impact of different policy mixes on firms’ innovative behaviour and also to gain a better understanding 
of the sources of the potential difference between estimates achieved for treatments vulnerable to confounding and 
those addressing the hidden treatment problem. 
 
Secondly, since the treatments are not randomly  assigned, we may clearly incur biased estimation due to potential 
selection biases. As stressed by Aerts and Schmidt (2008), the source of these potential  biases is twofold. On the one 
side, firms receiving subsidies or innovative public procurement contracts are always selected by public institutions 
that might well cherry-pick winners on the basis of some peculiar characteristics.  For example it is very likely that 
governments are willing to maximize the probability of success of their innovation policies and hence tend to select 
firms that are already more innovative than others. On the other side, firms that are able to apply for R&D grants or to 
submit a project for an innovative public procurement competition, possibly possess information or search capability 
advantages over firms that fail to spot opportunities to apply to public programmes and they will self-select them selves 
into the application process. For instance, larger firms may have specific staff devoted to this purpose while smaller 
ones may not. These two sources of potential  selection biases make the treated groups, for each treatment, intrinsically 
distinct from the control groups. For this reason we cannot interpret  a between-groups prospective mean difference 
in innovative  behaviour as the causal effect of the technology policies, since the two groups would behave differently 
even in the absence of the treatment. Formally: 
 
AT T = E[Y T − YC |T ] + E(YC |T ) − E(YC |C) (1) 
E(YC |T ) − E(YC |C) * 0 (2) 
 
where ATT is the average treatment effect we are interested in, Y T is the outcome variable representing the inno- 
vative behavior if treated, YC  is the same outcome variable if untreated and T and C define the belonging to treated 
or control groups. Clearly YC |T is not observed and, since the second equation is different from zero (i.e. non-zero 
selection bias), the use of the mean outcome of untreated individuals,  E(YC |C), as a substitute  for the counterfactual 
mean for treated, is not possible. For a proper identification  of the treatment effect, an alternative solution is required. 
While the hidden treatment has been mostly neglected in the literature, especially in empirical studies intended to 
evaluate the effect of R&D subsidies on innovative  activities,  the selection bias issue has been widely acknowledged 
and effectively tackled in several works. Here we follow the approach applied by Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Aerts 
and Schmidt (2008) and Czarnitzki  and Lopes Bento (2011), who introduce non-parametric matching methods into 
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innovation policy studies. The basic idea of matching is to find a wide group of non-treated individuals that are similar 
to the treated ones in all the relevant pre-treatment characteristics and to use this group as a perfect substitute for the 
non-observable counterfactual group (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
For an identification and a consistent  estimation  of the average treatment  effect (ATT) through the matching 
method, two conditions  need to be satisfied. The first one is unconfoundedness, or the conditional  independence 
assumption(CIA), which formally states: 
 
(YC ; Y T ) ⊥ W |X (3) 
This condition implies that the assignment to treatment is independent of the outcome (W), conditional  on a set of 
observable covariates (X). For the CIA to be valid all the possible variables affecting the probability  of being treated 
should be known and taken into account. Even though this condition is not testable, it is very likely that it requires 
a high-dimension  vector of exogenous covariates to hold true. Since, in that case, exact matching on observables is 
very difficult to implement, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that it is possible to condense the vector of relevant 
covariates into a single scalar index, called the propensity score. This measure is the probability of being treated given 
the relevant covariates.  At a given  value of the propensity  score, the exposure to treatment should be random and 
therefore both treated and control units should be on average observationally  identical. 
The second requirement  that has to be satisfied is the common support condition. It ensures that the vector of 
relevant covariates is not by itself able to predict perfectly whether an individual is receiving  a treatment or not. 
 
0 < P(T |X) < 1 (4) 
Thus, we should not observe a significant  share of firms that, given the relevant observable characteristics, are 
assigned with certainty to the group receiving subsidies, winning  innovative public procurement contracts or using tax 
credits. 
If both conditions hold, propensity  score matching  produces unbiased estimates of the average treatment effect 
considering the difference in outcomes over the common support, weighted by the propensity  score of individuals 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Formally: 
PsmAT T = E(Y T |T ) − EP(x)  T [YC |C, P(X)] (5) 
As in the case of Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), given the abundance of information on firms’ characteristics available, 
we implement propensity score matching to mitigate  potential selection biases, assuming the CIA condition to hold. 
 
However in our framework the common approach to propensity score matching, in which the treatment is binary, 
can be adopted only for the three treatments vulnerable to procedural confounding.  In these cases we purposely do 
not account for policy interactions to obtain benchmarks estimates for evaluating the relevance of the hidden treatment 
problem, hence each treatment can be considered separately. When we instead deal with treatments explicitly designed 
to eliminate the confounding, since we account for policies simultaneity,  we have to consider different  treatments as 
mutually  exclusive.  We therefore have to deal with M+1 treatments, denoted 0,1,.., M, with the 0 representing the 
absence of treatment. In the multiple  treatment context the average treatment effect should be recovered by: 
 
AT T = E(Y m |T = m) − (Y l |T = m) (6) 
 
where m is the treatment that we would like to evaluate and l is the treatment against which we are comparing 
m. Since in this study we are mainly interested in assessing the importance  of the hidden treatment problem, we will 
always confront different treatments with the absence of treatment and therefore l will always be T=0. 
As in the binary case, the outcome Y l |T=m is not observed and we therefore have to rely on firms receiving 
treatment l to estimate the counterfactual outcome.  To solve the identification  problem Imbens (2000) and Lechner 
(2001) generalized the model developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), showing that it is possible to extend the 
use of propensity score matching to the multiple treatment case. The "generalized propensity score"(Imbens, 2000) 
is hence defined  as the conditional probability of receiving  a particular  level of treatment given the pre-treatment 
characteristics. As in the binary treatment case, matching on the generalized propensity  score allows us to estimate 
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consistently the average treatment effect if the conditional  independence assumption (CIA) and the common support 
condition hold. The CIA in the multi-treatment case can be formalized as follows: 
 
(Y 0 ; Y 1 ; Y .. ; Y M ) ⊥ W |X = x, ∀x ∈ χ (7) 
 
where (Y 0 , Y 1 , Y .. , Y M ) is the entire set of outcomes and χ is a set of covariates for which the average treatment 
effect is defined. This condition  implies  that the researcher should be able to observe all the characteristics that jointly 
affect the participation in the treatments and the outcomes. The common support condition  for the multiple-treatment 
case is instead: 
0 < Pm (X) < 1, ∀m = 0, 1, .., M  (8) 
Pm (X) = P(T = m|X) (9) 
requiring, as in the binary  case, the probability of participating in one specific treatment to belong strictly to the interval 
(0,1). 
If these two conditions  are satisfied the average treatment effect in the multiple  treatment context can be consis- 
tently estimated by the following generalized propensity score matching estimator: 
PsmAT T = E(Y m |T = m) − EPm (X),Pl (X) [E(Y l |Pm (X), Pl (X), T = l)|T = m] (10) 
In the next sections we briefly describe the data and the variables employed to perform the matching procedure. 
In section 3.6 we illustrate the propensity score specification, discuss matching quality in terms of balancing and the 
common support assumption and eventually present the results. 
 
3.2. Data 
In the analysis, we use data from the Innobarometer on "Strategic Trends in Innovation 2006-2008", which is a 
survey conducted by the Gallup Organization upon the request of DG Enterprise and Industry in April 2009 in the 27 
member states of the EU, Norway and Switzerland3 . Gallup interviewed  senior company managers responsible for 
strategic decisions in 5238 companies 4 . The project surveyed companies with more than 20 employees in a large 
selection of sectors5 . 
This survey has already been used by Flowers et al. (2009), who investigate the role of users in the innovative 
process, and by Filippetti and Archibugi  (2009), Borowiecki  and Dziura (2010) and Filippetti and Archibugi (2011) , 
who focus on the impact of the crisis upon innovation, and cited in various reports (among others in Kaiser and Kripp 
(2010)). 
 
3.3. Treatment indicators 
As described in the previous section in order to take care of the hidden treatment issue we design different treat- 
ments out of the technology policy tools possibly adopted by surveyed firms. By exploiting the information  at our 
disposal in the dataset, we construct treatment indicators for the main policies, innovation subsidies, tax credits and 
innovative public procurement, and then consider their possible interactions.  One of the most interesting features of 
the Innobarometer survey is that the surveyed firms were expressly asked about any public procurement contracts they 
have been awarded and whether this procurement contract provided them with the opportunity of selling an innovation. 
We are hence able to create a treatment indicator,  defined as Policy_Procurement,  which takes the value 1 for firms 
answering "yes" to the question "Did at least one of the public procurement contracts that you have won since 2006 
 
 
3 http://cordis.europa.eu/innovation/en/policy/innobarometer.htm . We are in debt with Antony Arundel who provided us with the data 
4 A detailed description of data collection  and of the survey can be read at http://www.proinno-europe.eu/page/innobarometer. 
5 Aerospace engines, Aerospace vehicles,  Defence, Analyt. Instr., Constr. Equipment, Apparel, Automotive, Build.  Fixtures, Equip., Ser- 
vices, Business services, Chemical Products, Communications equipment, Construction / Materials, Distribution  services, Energy, Entertainment, 
Financial services, Fishing and fishing products, Footwear, Furniture, Heavy construction services, Heavy machinery, Hospitality and tourism, 
Information  technology, Jewellery and precious metals, Leather products, Lighting and electrical Equipment, Lumber & Wood Mfrs, Medical de- 
vices, Metal Manufacturing, Oil and gas products and services, Other, Paper, (Bio)Pharmaceuticals,  Plastics, Power Generation & Transmission, 
Processed Food, Publishing  and Printing,  Sport and Child Goods, Textiles, Transportation and Logistics, Utility. 
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include the possibility to sell an innovation (i.e. new or significantly improved products or services)?" and 0 for firms 
that won only general procurement contracts (i.e. no innovation involved) or firms that did not win any procurement 
contracts. 
This indicator  represents a major improvement  with respect to other quantitative studies dedicated to public pro- 
curement.  Most innovation  surveys such as the Community  Innovation  Survey or the KNOW survey6  have not so 
far included  specific questions about procurement and therefore previous works based on CIS-like survey could only 
construct noisy proxies for innovative public procurement.  That was also the case of the above-mentioned work by 
Aschhoff  and Sofka (2009) which considered a firm as receiving the public procurement treatment if the respondent 
acknowledged  customers as an important  source of innovation for the firm and if those customers belonged to the 
NACE sectors 75.1, 75.2 and 75.3 for public administration,  defense or compulsory social security. Even if it might 
be thought of as a second-best proxy,  it still does not ensure the engagement of the surveyed firm in any procurement 
contract with governments or other public agencies. The NACE sector 75 also, in fact, includes several public and 
private companies7 . Having  those companies as customers inducing  innovation  in the surveyed firms does not im- 
ply a direct or indirect  purchasing channel between a public agency and the surveyed firm nor a direct link between 
public procurement and innovation.  This problem could have clearly led to overstatement of the relevance of public 
procurement in spurring innovation. 
Unfortunately, while the Innobarometer  dataset allows  us to gain some accuracy on the treatment indicator for 
public procurement with respect to previous studies, this improvement  comes at a cost. Concerning supply-side 
policies the Innobarometer survey did not directly ask firms whether they received R&D grants or benefited from tax 
credits for R&D but only whether changes in those policies have contributed  to innovation8 . We are therefore forced to 
construct our treatment indicators as proxies for the receipt of supply-side innovation policies. In particular we build 
the variable Policy_Subsidies, which takes the value 1 if a firm reported that "changes in public financial support" 
had a positive effect on innovation  and 0 (otherwise) if the firm did not report a positive effect of the public financial 
support or if it stated that this particular question did not apply to its specific situation. In the same way we define a 
treatment indicator Policy_Tax Credits with a value 1 for firms reporting that "changes in tax environment (e.g. R&D 
or innovation tax credits)" had a positive effect on innovation and 0 otherwise. 
We are aware that such variables may generate some concerns. In particular a potential problem may arise from 
the fact that among the firms that did not report a positive effect of the two supply-side policies, hence replying "no" 
to the specific question in the survey, there might also be firms receiving public financial support for innovation or 
using tax credits but experiencing either no effect or negative effects from participating in these policy programs. 
Nevertheless we believe that our indicators are good proxies for participation in programmes.  In order to be more 
confident about the fact that the questions in the Innobarometer  survey could be used to construct good proxies for 
the receipt of subsidies, we also confronted the data at our disposal with those that can be retrieved from Community 
Innovation Surveys implemented in different European countries for 2006-2008. Since the CIS survey explicitly asks 
firms whether they received subsidies or benefited from tax credits9  it allows us to construct a dummy variable that 
accurately reports whether a firm received innovation subsidies or not but without disentangling direct and indirect 
financial support. We therefore build a similar variable exploiting the information from the Innobarometer survey (i.e. 
a binary that takes the value 1 if a firm answered "yes" to at least one among Policy_Subsidies Policy_TaxCredits  and 
Policy_TaxCredits  variable takes the value 1 and 0 otherwise).  We then confront the average participation  rates in 
subsidies programmes for firms in the Innobarometer  and the CIS survey accounting for firms’ size, activity sector 
and state and we find no statistically significant difference. To assess further  the goodness of our indicator, we also 
estimate the probability  of receiving subsidies both for the Innobarometer and for the CIS data taking into account the 
 
 
6 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/microdata/cis  and Caloghirou et al. (2006) 
7 Nace sector 84 (sector 75 in Nace Rev. 1.1) includes very large and technological  intensive European firms, such as BAE Systems, European 
Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS), Finmeccanica, Thales, QinetiQ, Babcock International Group, Rheinmetall AG and Patria. 
8 The exact question states: "Have  significant  changes in the following policy-related  areas introduced  since 2006 had a positive  effect on 
innovation in your company? a) Changes in tax environment (e.g. R&D or innovation tax credits) b) Changes in public financial support (grants, 
loans, support for recruiting new staff)". The potential responses for each option were:" Yes, No, Not Applicable". 
9 The CIS question states: "During  the 3 years 2006-2008 did your enterprise receive any financial support from the following levels of govern- 
ment? Include financial support via tax credits or deductions, grants, subsided loans and loans guaranteed. Exclude research and other innovation 
activities conducted entirely for the public sector under contract".  The possible answers are "yes" and "no" for three different government levels: 
regional government, central government and European Union. 
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size of the firm, its sector and country of origin and the probability  of being surveyed in one survey rather than in the 
other. A detailed description of this comparison can be found in the Appendix. In figure A.1 it is possible to see how 
the probability of receiving subsidies is distributed in a similar way when we consider the CIS data with the "accurate 
indicator"  and the Innobarometer data together with our proxy variable. 
 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
 
Moreover,  as we noticed above, the main issue that may affect our treatment indicators relates to firms that are 
potential participants in innovation support programmes that did not report a positive effect on innovation.  Since our 
proxy variable would  consider them as not receiving  any subsidy this could bias the results to some extent. However, 
we might be able to say something about the direction  of the bias. Inasmuch  as we would consider  as treated only 
firms that report positive effects on innovation, if any, we may expect the overestimation of the impact of subsidies 
on R&D expenditures. In the presence of this kind of bias due to the potential inaccuracy of our proxies, we should 
therefore be less likely to find evidence of severe hidden treatment problems for supply-side policy tools. 
 
Once we have designed the treatment indicators for the three major policies and briefly discussed their effec- 
tiveness, we now take into account the hidden treatment problem they could be vulnerable to. In order to do that, 
we have to create the variables Policy_Subsidies_only, Policy_Procurement_only,  and Policy_Tax credit_only, which 
identify  firms that respectively received only innovation  subsidies, used only tax credits or won only innovative public 
procurement.   Since, as it emerges in sections 3.1 and 3.2, it is also worth analysing the case when different policy 
treatments are simultaneously  administered to the same firm, we create four different variables taking into account 
potential synchronous treatments. We hence build the following dummy variables: Policy_Sub_Tax, which pinpoints 
firms receiving innovation subsidies and using tax credits, Policy_Sub_IPP, identifying firms receiving subsidies and 
winning innovative public procurement contracts, Policy_IPP_Tax, for firms that obtained procurement contracts and 
benefited from tax credits and finally Policy_All, which identifies firms receiving all three treatments simultaneously. 
The control group is instead always composed only of firms that are not receiving any of the treatment.  Table A.1 
recaps the 10 treatment indicators along with the number of firms they are administered to. As stressed in the table 
the first 3 treatments are the one exposed to the hidden treatment problem while the second and the third group of in- 
dicators take into account all the possible interactions between different treatments, therefore controlling  for potential 
confounding effects10 . As table A.1 reports the size of the control group for the first three treatments changes. This 
is due to the fact that for each treatment vulnerable to confounding the control group includes firms that are receiving 
other treatments.  When we control for interactions in order to eliminate the hidden treatment problem the control 
group is instead composed only by firms which do not receive any of the potentially simultaneous treatments. 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
3.4. Outcome indicator 
To construct the input indicator, we exploit the following question from the Innobarometer survey: "Compared to 
2006, has the amount spent by your firm on all innovation activities in 2008 increased, decreased, or stayed approxi- 
mately the same (adjust for inflation)?" 11 . As described by Filippetti and Archibugi  (2011), this question allows us to 
grasp trend in firms’ innovation  spending, hence we use it to create the binary variable INNO_increase, which takes 
the value 1 for firms that increased their total innovation  expenditure in 2008 with respect to 2006 and 0 if no increase 
was reported.  A caveat should be made; this outcome variable is dichotomous, that is respondents declared whether 
 
 
10 It should be also noted from table A.1 that if we add up the number of firms for the second and the third group of treatments by different policy 
instrument the total does not reach the number of firms that are receiving the treatment in the first group. This is due to the fact that among the firms 
reporting to have received a given treatment (for instance innovative public procurement contracts) there are some of them that did not answer to the 
question about one of the other (or both) potential treatments (tax credits or subsidies). In that case we cannot argue whether those firms benefited 
from only one policy  ore more than one and they are hence not considered as treated for the treatments of the second and the third group. 
11 This is question Q3 in the Innobarometer Survey. All innovation activities are listed in Q1 and include: a) Research and development  within 
your company, b) Research and development  performed  for your company by other enterprises or by research organisations,  c) Acquisition of 
new or significantly  improved machinery, equipment and software, d) Purchase or licensing of patents, inventions,  know-how,  and other types 
of knowledge, Training to support innovative activities, f) Design ,g) Application for a patent  or registration of a design. Question Q3 of the 
Innobarometer survey mimics question 5.2 of the CIS survey and follows the definition of ’total innovation  expenditure’  stated in the Oslo Manual. 
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they had increased their innovative expenses or not. Therefore, this variable might suffer from an overestimation  bias 
due to its self-reported  nature and, thus, the results might be distorted in the direction of favouring additionality or 
complementarity of technology policy with private innovation efforts. However, this is a common  issue in innovation 
surveys, which can be dealt with only by careful interpretation of the results. Moreover due to the binary nature of our 
outcome variable, the average outcomes for treated and control  firms should be considered as participation  rates and 
therefore the average treatment effect represents the difference in the proportion of firms that increased their innovative 
spending between the treated and the control group. 
Due to its dichotomous  nature and to the fact that it collects the increase in all innovation  expenditures and not 
only investment in R&D, this variable may appear less fit to evaluate the effect of the given policies upon innovative 
input with respect to variables,  such as R&D intensity, used in other studies (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Aerts and 
Schmidt, 2008), nevertheless we believe that it is suitable to analyze the additionality  issue for several reasons. First 
of all, in most cross-sectional studies dealing with the crowding-out in expenditure on innovation inputs the effect of 
the policy measure is recovered by comparing the R&D expenses (or intensity) for treated firms with those of firms 
in the control group. The positive (negative) change in the expenditure for innovation input is therefore inferred by 
comparing investment levels for different firms but no actual change in R&D or innovation expenditure at the firm 
level is observed. The variable INNO_increase  reports instead whether a firm actually declared a rise in its innovation 
effort or not over the surveyed time span12 . As in Duguet (2004), knowing if a firm that receives a subsidy is (not) 
incrementing (at all) its innovation investment is then sufficient to test the full crowding-out  hypothesis, i.e. if the 
subsidy fully replaces private money. Our variable allows us to examine whether firms receiving different technology 
policies are more likely to raise their innovation effort with respect to control firms. No differences in the share of 
firms rising their innovation effort between the treated and the control group would therefore imply, everything else 
equal, the presence of full crowding-out among treated firms. 
Secondly, it is true that by referring to the total innovation expenditure we are not looking at the sole investment 
in formal R&D as in Almus  and Czarnitzki  (2003) and Aerts and Schmidt (2008), nevertheless several studies in this 
stream of literature (Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; Czarnitzki and Bento, 2012) used variables 
based on total innovation expenditure to assess the relevance  of the additionality  vs. crowding-out  issue. Moreover, 
as pointed  out by Kleinknecht et al. (2002), R&D measurement tends to be ’manufacturing  biased’ and to severely 
underestimate small scale and informal  R&D activities, mainly conducted in services and in smaller firms. Using total 
innovation expenditure hence allows to better evaluate the real size of the innovation effort, independently from the 
sector and the size of the surveyed firms. 
The last row of tables A.2, A.4, and A.3 shows some descriptive  statistics. Table A.2 reports the descriptive 
statistics over all the samples, while the remaining two tables show the stratification over various types of policy. 
 
3.5. Control variables 
The data at hand provide  us with abundant information  to account for firms’ characteristics13 .  We hence use 
this information to build several control variables that we will use in the propensity  score specification  described 
in section 3.6. As a proxy for the size of the firm, we use 4 categories (SIZE_1-4)  for small (20-49, employees), 
medium (50-249), medium-large (249-500) and large (500+) enterprises. Similarly,  we introduce a dummy for young 
firms (YOUNG_FIRM), which takes the value of 1 if a firm was set up after 2001 and 0 otherwise.  We also create 
binary variables to control for the industrial sector14 (SECTOR, 37 variables) and for the country of origin of the firm 
(COUNTRY, 29 dummies). We create 4 dummies that assess whether the firm sells its products or services in its own 
region(MKT_region), in its own country (MKT_national), in the European Union market (MKT_eu)  or in the global 
market (MKT_global) 15 .  Since,  as suggested by Almus and Czarnitzki  (2003), the engagement in R&D activity 
can proxy for a firm’s absorptive capacity and its endogenous ability to write proposal for R&D subsidies and public 
procurement we also build the dummy R&D_ACT, which reports whether a firm engaged in internal R&D activities. 
 
 
12 Duguet (2004) used an outcome variable built in a similar way, i.e. increment or not in R&D expenditure, to evaluate the complementar- 
ity/substitutability between R&D public subsidies and private investment in France. 
13 The Innobarometer survey begins with a series of basic questions regarding the surveyed company (question D1 to D5). 
14 Aggregation based on the NACE 2-digit sectoral level, revision 1.1. 
15 Notice that these variables are not mutually exclusive since the question in the survey does not ask where the firm’s core activity is located but 
only if it sells products on the different markets. 
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Table A.2 reports descriptive statistics and figure A.2 tabulates interactions between firm characteristics and policy 
tools. According to this picture it is not straightforward to determine whether policies have any effect on firms’ 
innovative behavior. At the same time, the picture shows that the distribution  of policies is constantly biased towards 
large firms suggesting a possible source of selection bias. On this ground, the next section discusses both how to use 
these data to spot statistically  a causal effect of different and potentially coexistent policy tools, on firms’ innovative 
activity. 
 
[Table 2 about here.] 
[Table 3 about here.] 
[Table 4 about here.] 
[Figure 2 about here.] 
3.6. Propensity score specification 
As pointed out in the previous section, the propensity score consists of a measure of the probability of an individual 
being treated conditional  on a set of relevant characteristics. The first step is therefore the detection of those variables 
affecting the likelihood of the treatment. Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) provide some practical guidance on tackling 
the issue of variable selection: 
 
Only variables that influence simultaneously the participation  decision and the outcome variable should 
be included. Hence, economic theory, a sound knowledge of previous research and also information about 
the institutional settings should guide the researcher in building up the model [...]. It should also be clear 
that only variables that are unaffected by participation  should be included in the model. To ensure this, 
variables should either be fixed over time or measured before participation (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008, 
p. 39 ). 
 
Following  their suggestion, we make explicit reference to the literature using propensity score matching applied to 
innovation policy tools and list the possible  candidates as relevant covariates. Following  Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), 
we include variables collecting firms’ characteristics discussed in section 3.5 as covariates: specifically  dummies for 
the sector, country of origin and size of the firm, a binary that reports whether is a young firm or not, four dummies 
for different markets in which a company may operate and a dummy for the performance of in-house R&D activities. 
 
As mentioned in section 3.2 the dataset exhibits a cross-sectional structure with data for a three year time period 
(2006-2008) and the information  on the firms gathered through a survey conducted during April 2009. Firms charac- 
teristics are hence recorded after the potential  treatment had been administered.  We thus have to assume that firms’ 
features are fixed over time and, hence, unaffected by any of the treatment.  While this assumption is reasonable for 
variables such as country  of origin, industrial  sector, age and activity location, this is not necessarily the case for the 
size of the firm and the in-house performing  of R&D. Nevertheless, the endogeneity issue for the size variable should 
not represent a severe problem in our context. Even though it is in fact possible that firms receiving specific technol- 
ogy policies might be more prone to increase the number of employees, we do not measure size through a continuous 
variable but by means of 4 dummies for small(20-49, employees), medium (50-249), medium-large (249-500) and 
large (500+)  enterprises. For this reason, a possible change in size should be negligible because only in a very limited 
number of cases would  it switch one firm from one class to another. 
To a lesser extent, the variable R&D_ACT, revealing whether a firm performed R&D activities within the company, 
might also present some risk of endogeneity, if a firm performed some internal R&D only as a consequence  of the 
technology policies. While this is clearly not the case for a policy such R&D tax credits, it cannot be entirely  ruled 
out for subsidies and innovative public procurement. However, since it is more likely for a company  to compete for 
subsidies if some in-house R&D has already been implemented,  the endogeneity problem should not be a severe one. 
 
Unfortunately,  as mentioned in section 3.2, the dataset lacks variables taking into account the economic perfor- 
mance of the firm or proxies for its market share measured before participation  in treatments.  The dataset contains 
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some information  about trends in companies’ turnover, but we do not include this information in the analysis  as is 
generally performed in similar works (Almus and Czarnitzki,  2003; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Aschhoff and Sofka, 
2009) since it is possible that increasing (decreasing) revenues are affected by the treatments. This is especially true in 
the case of innovative public procurement, because winning  a tender has an unambiguous impact on a firm’s turnover 
and it is reasonable for subsidies as well. In the three-years time span in which the data are collected, a R&D grant re- 
ceived in 2006 might lead to an innovation embodied in a product (service), the sales of which determined an increase 
in revenues, for a specific  firm, only in 2008. However, the size of the firm, the country, and the sector may collect 
some of the aggregate demand fluctuations affecting firms’ economic performance and reduce the portion of variation 
remaining unexplained due to the omission of turnover variables 16 . 
 
Once the relevant variables have been identified,  we estimate different  propensity scores, one for each treatment. 
As discussed in section 3.2, we have to deal with two kinds of treatments. The first kind includes the Policy_Subsidies, 
Policy_Tax Credits and Policy_Procurement treatments which are vulnerable to confounding  since they do not take into 
account the potential presence of a simultaneous treatment.  The second group consists of those treatments that con- 
sider every possible interactions among treatments and are purposely designed to eliminate the hidden treatment prob- 
lems ( Policy_Subsidies_only, Policy_Procurement_only,  Policy_Taxcredit_only,  Policy_Sub_Tax, Policy_Sub_IPP, 
Policy_IPP_Tax, Policy_All). Since the treatments of the first kind are not mutually exclusive while those of the sec- 
ond are, we need different discrete choice models to estimate the propensity scores. For what concerns the first three 
cases we therefore  run three probit  regressions, regarding  each treatment  as independent  from the others in the com- 
mon binary treatment framework (Treatment=1, no Treatment=0). The results of the probit regressions are presented 
in table A.5. For the second group we instead have to consider the different treatments as reciprocally exclusive and to 
frame the treatment model in the multivariate context illustrated by Lechner (2001) and Gerfin and Lechner (2002). To 
compute the propensity scores for this case we hence implement  a multinomial logit model (Larsson, 2003; Brodaty 
et al., 2001) with eight alternatives.  The baseline of the model is always the no-treatment condition (T=0, firms not 
receiving any of the policy tools) while alternatives 1 to 7 account for the seven treatment conditions.  The outcomes 
of the logistic  regression are reported in table A.6. 
 
[Table 5 about here.] 
[Table 6 about here.] 
The outcomes confirm that several sectoral and country dummies significantly  affect the probability  of receiving 
treatments in both the bivariate and the multivariate  case. As expected, the variable with the clearest influence on the 
likelihood of being treated is the one reporting whether a firm performs in-house R&D activities. Table A.6 shows how 
size appears to have a major impact on the probability  of winning  an innovative  public procurement contract and, as 
in Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), on the probability of obtaining subsidies; specifically, medium and large enterprises 
have higher odds of receiving R&D grants than very small companies. 
 
We then use the propensity  scores recovered for each treatment to perform  a non-parametric matching.  As a match- 
ing algorithm17 , we implement  the nearest-neighbor procedure and a "caliper" threshold which imposes a tolerance 
level on the maximum propensity score distance to avoid bad matches18 . 
As pointed out by Caliendo and Kopeinig  (2008), the choice of the algorithm to apply is a matter of a trade-off 
in terms of bias and efficiency  of the estimator and this choice abundantly relies on the nature of the data at hand. 
The nearest-neighbor matching, using only the closest observation in terms of propensity  score as a comparison  for 
a treated individual,  allows for smaller biases at the price of higher variance.  Since, as table A.7 shows, the control 
group is much larger than the treated one for every treatment, in order to raise the efficiency of our estimates, we use up 
 
 
16 In line with this reasoning, including turnover variables in the probit and multilogit regressions is only slightly modifying the propensity scores 
estimation and is not changing significantly any of the results in terms of ATT presented in section 4. 
17 See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a discussion. 
18 To implement the matching we used the stata module psmatch2, developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). As suggested by the rule of thumb 
first introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) we set the caliper option to .015, a value that corresponds approximately  to .25 times the standard 
deviation of the propensity scores recovered with the probit/multilogit regressions. 
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to three neighbors to build the counterfactual outcomes. While this kind of oversampling allows us to gain efficiency, 
the caliper threshold ensures that using more information does not lead to bad matches. 
However, to be sure that our results are not sensitive to the algorithm specification, we also perform the matching 
using the kernel algorithm19   and a single nearest-neighbor procedure as robustness checks. In section 4 we present a 
comparison between the different results. 
The inclusion of this threshold together with the common support restriction described in section 3.2 leads, as in 
Gerfin and Lechner (2002), Larsson (2003), Czarnitzki  and Lopes Bento (2011) to the loss of a few treated observations 
for which is not possible to find a close comparison  in terms of propensity scores. As table A.7 reports the total loss 
of observations by treatment is always less than 10 % of the size of the treated group. 
 
[Table 7 about here.] 
 
 
A key step in the matching procedure is the evaluation of the matching quality, that is, the assessment of the ability 
of the matching procedure to balance the distribution  of the relevant variable in the control and the treatment group. 
The literature  puts forward  several methods: Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) suggest a procedure that computes the 
standardized bias for each of the relevant covariates as a percentage of the square root of sample variance in the treated 
and not-treated groups. Generally,  a reduction  of the mean standardized bias under the 3 % or 5% threshold after 
matching is usually considered sufficient to support the success of the procedure. Sianesi (2004) proposes to consider 
the propensity  score on the matched sample only and then to compare the pseudo-R2  for treated and non-treated 
participants, before and after the matching.  Since the pseudo-R2  somehow grasps the extent to which the variation 
in the sample is explained by the vector of the relevant covariates, once the sample is matched conditioning on this 
vector, the pseudo-R2 on the matched sample conditioned on this vector should be much lower than in the unmatched 
case. Moreover, it is possible to perform a likelihood  ratio test for the joint insignificance of all the regressors: the test 
should be rejected before matching and not rejected after the matching procedure. The three methods described above 
are applied to all the matching performed in the paper. 
 
[Table 8 about here.] 
 
The results reported in table A.8 show how, for all the estimations, the mean standardized bias (Meanbias) falls 
below the 5% threshold (mostly below 3%) after the matching,  the pseudo-R2   considerably  decreases passing from 
the raw to the matched sample and the likelihood  ratio test ( LR chi2 ) leads us always to reject the hypothesis of joint 
insignificance  before the matching and never to reject it for the matched sample. The overall matching performance 
hence appears to be good. 
 
Finally, as pointed  out by Caliendo and Kopeinig  (2008), there is a need to assess the overlapping between sub- 
samples through a graphic analysis of the propensity score density distribution,  in both treated and the control group. 
Before the matching procedure the two distributions should differ, but they still need to have a support that partially 
overlaps. Otherwise, the common support condition  presented in section 3.1, would  be violated  because the relevant 
covariates would be able to predict perfectly if a firm is receiving  a treatment or not. Intuitively the matching procedure 
is implemented to “correct” for the difference in the distribution,  which can be thought of as a visual representation 
of the selection bias. After the matching,  the two distributions  should therefore be more similar and have a much 
larger common support. In figures A.3, A.4 and A.5 we report the graphs of the density distribution of the estimated 
propensity  scores for the treated and the control group before and after the matching. 
[Figure 3 about here.] 
[Figure 4 about here.] 
[Figure 5 about here.] 
 
 
19 The Kernel matching estimator calculates the counterfactual outcome for each treated individual  using the weighted averages of observations 
from all individuals in the control  group and assigns higher weight to observations closer in terms of propensity score. Thus the kernel matching 
estimator provides some advantages in terms of lower variance because it uses more information than other algorithms. 
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As expected, for every treatment there are some differences in the density distributions  among the two subsamples 
before the matching;  nonetheless, as required, the common support condition  appears to hold everywhere. 
After the pairing procedure is implemented the graphs show that the propensity score matching abundantly reduces 
the dissimilarities in the distributions. Moreover, the high degree of overlapping  signals the good quality of the 
matching procedure. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Since the goodness of the matching performance appears to hold, we can cautiously  interpret  the average treatment 
effects, estimated through multiple propensity  score matching  procedures, as the causal impact  of the ten different 
treatments on firms’ innovative input. The results of the estimations are reported in table A.9 for each treatment. 
Figure A.6 graphically depicts some of the results. 
 
[Table 9 about here.] 
[Figure 6 about here.] 
The table includes the average outcomes for the treated and control groups, both before and after the matching. We 
are interested in the ATT value of the column “difference”, which is the difference in averages between the two groups 
after the pairing as discussed in section 3.120 . Since the outcome variables are dichotomous, the average outcomes in 
the table represent a participation  rate and therefore the average outcomes display the share of the firms that increase 
their spending in innovation activities both for the treated and for the control group.  The average treatment effect in 
the column “difference”  should therefore be interpreted as the change in percentage points of the proportion of firms 
that increase their spending in innovative input after participating in a given technology  policy. For instance, in the 
case of Policy_Procurement, the number of firms that increase their spending is 11.2 percentage points higher among 
firms that won an innovative public procurement contract. 
 
As pointed out in section 3.1 the first three treatments that we take into account, Policy_Subsidies, Policy_Pro- 
curement, and Policy_Tax Credits are vulnerable to potential confounding effects because there is no control for inter- 
actions among them. However, we show the results to lay down a comparison with the previous literature which has 
never discussed the possible interactions or the existence of a hidden treatment. Regarding Policy_Subsidies treatment, 
our results seem to be coherent with those provided by the large body of literature (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Aerts 
and Schmidt, 2008; Czarnitzki and Bento, 2012; González et al., 2005) that reports no evidence of crowding-out effect 
(or substitutability) on private investments in innovation inputs due to R&D subsidies. Moreover, our results appear 
to confirm the reinforcing  effect between public subsidies and private efforts found by Almus and Czarnitzki (2003). 
Receiving  subsidies indeed seems to have a positive and significant  impact in terms of innovative input since there are 
7.8 percentage points more firms that are increasing their total innovation  expenditure in the treated group than in the 
control group. Similarly, firms receiving R&D tax credits are 10 percentage points more likely to declare an increase 
in innovation spending than those in the control group. A comparison with the previous literature, which finds at the 
margin a dollar-for-dollar  increase in R&D private expenses (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000), is difficult due to the di- 
chotomous nature of our treatment variable. However, the result points in the direction  suggested by the literature, that 
is an overall positive impact of tax credits. Also for the treatment Policy_Procurement  the results are rather consistent 
with the evidence delivered by the still limited literature on the role of innovative  public  procurement as a technology 
policy tool. As in Lichtenberg (1988) and Slavtchev and Wiederhold (2011), we find a positive and significant  effect 
of innovative  public  procurement on private expenses in innovation  activities:  there are 11.2 percentage points more 
firms increasing their private spending in innovative inputs in the treated than in the control group. A first compar- 
ison among the two policies  seems to support the theoretical hypothesis made by Geroski (1990) that, under some 
circumstances, innovative public procurement may be more effective than subsidies in stimulating private investments 
in innovation activities. 
 
 
20 The line “unmachted” is reported to appreciate the difference  between the unbiased estimations (ATT) and the biased ones where both the 
magnitude of the effects and their significance levels are inflated. 
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We now turn to the analysis of the treatments (Policy_Subsidies_only,  Policy_Procurement_only,   Policy_Tax 
credit_only ) which consider instead each policy in isolation from the others in order to eliminate the potential pro- 
cedural confounding,  as explained in section 3.1. The most interesting result comes from comparing the impact for 
Policy_Subsidies_only  and Policy_Subsidies treatment: in this case there is no evidence supporting the existence of 
any additionality  and the positive impact of R&D grants on R&D investment ceases to be significant.  Our hypothesis 
that other policies,  such as R&D tax credits and innovative  public procurement, might represent a crucial confounding 
factor in evaluating the impact of innovation  policies  seems therefore to be corroborated.  We may hence speculate 
that at least a portion  of the reinforcing effect between public subsidies and private innovation input found in earlier 
works (Almus and Czarnitzki,  2003) might be explained by the fact that those studies have not taken this sort of hidden 
treatment into account in their estimation.  The previous results on the additionality  of subsidies might therefore be 
carefully reconsidered. A similar conclusion applies to R&D tax credits, which, when considered in isolation without 
the confounding effect of possible hidden treatments, remain significant at the 10% level but almost halve their effect. 
While the procedural confounding seems to play a key role in the evaluation of the impact of subsidies and R&D tax 
credits on firms’ innovative behavior, this does not appear to happen for innovative public procurement.  Table A.9 
reveals that the differences between the treated and the control group are positive and strongly significant  also in the 
case of Policy_Procurement_only treatment and not dissimilar from those recovered for Policy_Procurement. This re- 
sult is to some extent coherent with the findings of Aschhoff and Sofka (2009), who implicitly take into consideration 
the potential complementarity of different policy programmes and report a robust positive effect of procurement; thus, 
the second indisputable result is that innovative public procurement has a positive impact on the probability  of a firm 
self-declaring  an increase in total innovation expenditure. 
 
The last group of treatment concerns the possible interaction  among different  policies (Policy_Sub_Tax, Pol- 
icy_Sub_IPP, Policy_IPP_Tax  ). The effect of the treatment interaction is always significant and remarkably high. 
It seems that the best-performing policy mix is the interaction of innovative public procurement with both R&D tax 
credits and subsidies. Once again we should warn readers that a comparison of magnitudes should be a careful  one 
since the treatments are binary variables. 
This result offers us a double check as well as an explanation for the relevance of the procedural confounding issue 
in evaluating supply side programmes for supporting firms’ innovative activity. It clearly shows that the effect of finan- 
cial support retrieved for the treatment vulnerable to confounding (Policy_Subsidies) was driven by the policy mix and 
not by the effect of the subsidies programme alone. If we in fact considered grants and subsidies without  taking into 
account the potential hidden treatments, firms receiving subsidies only and firms both receiving subsidies and winning 
innovative  public  procurement contracts would have been thought as qualitatively identical. The comparison between 
the Policy_Sub_IPP and the Policy_Subsidies_only programs indicates instead that the two treatments together deter- 
mine very different innovative behaviours and suggest that, for firms receiving both treatments, the policy mix is pivotal 
in having a robust effect on private investments in innovation activities, once again in line with Geroski’s hypothesis 
(Geroski, 1990). However, the fact that the Policy_Sub_IPP  effect on investment in innovation inputs outperforms 
the impact of the Policy_Procurement_only  is also noteworthy (22 percentage points more firms than in the control 
group increase their innovative  effort when receiving both policies, while only 8,4 percentage points more firms in the 
treated than in the non-treated subsample are increasing their innovation  expenditures with Policy_Procurement_only), 
therefore confirming  a strong complementarity  between the two policy tools. We can also reject the hypothesis that 
innovative public procurement is solely responsible for the results since the policy mix involving both subsidies and 
tax credit performs rather well, whereas the two policies in isolation do not show a robust contribution  to the increase 
in private expenses in innovation inputs. 
However, it is not possible to compare statistically the effect of the interactions of two policies with the effect of 
the interaction of a different combination  of them since we use different matched firms of the control group. Similarly, 
it would be hard to compare it with the effect on firms receiving one policy only or three of them. Indeed, there might 
be a problem  of selection bias in the number of policies  that a firm received overall,  as discussed in Czarnitzki and 
Lopes Bento (2011). Nevertheless, with this caveat in mind, when considering the non-significance of subsidies alone 
and the small impact of tax credits alone, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the combined effect of any two policies 
is higher than the sum of those two policies in isolation. 
The last treatment of our concern is Policy_All, which considers the impact of receiving simultaneously subsidies, 
and tax credits and winning innovative public procurement contracts.  Table A.9 shows how the concurrence of the 
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three policy tools has a positive  and robust effect on innovation input. We in fact have 30 percentage points more 
firms in the subsample receiving the Policy_All  treatment than in the control subsample, which increase their private 
expenses in total innovation expenditure. Once again, we should be aware of the possible endogeneity due to the fact 
that firms able to be recipients of three types of policies might simply be better than the others. 
 
As a robustness check, we report the results obtained by using different matching methods.Table A.10 presents the 
results using the nearest-neighbor procedure with only one neighbor and table A.11 reports the outcome of a kernel 
estimation. As we mentioned in section 3.1, the decision about which algorithm to use in implementing the matching 
procedure is a matter of a trade-off  between efficiency  and bias. The approach we used so far (nearest neighbor with 
up to three neighbors) has the advantage of increasing the efficiency of the estimators without increasing the potential 
bias. The nearest-neighbor with only one neighbor guarantees even lower biases but at the price of lower efficiency as 
well, while the kernel estimator raises the efficiency but also the potential bias. As the tables show, the sign and the 
significance of the effect of different treatments on innovative  input are not changed by the algorithm shift, confirming 
the relevance of innovative  procurement as a confounding  factor and the complementarity  between innovative public 
procurement and supply-side technology policies. 
 
[Table 10 about here.] 
[Table 11 about here.] 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we analysed the effect of three technology policies on firms’ innovative behaviour. While the role 
of R&D public subsidies and R&D tax credits has been extensively  investigated in the literature, innovative public 
procurement  has only recently  regained attention and the empirical  evidence is still fragmented.  Moreover,  very 
limited work has been conducted taking into consideration the relevance of the possible interactions among policies. 
Our work tries to fill this gap. We especially hypothesized that evaluating the impact of a policy tool in a quasi- 
experimental setting without controlling for simultaneous public programmes aiming to achieve the same objective, 
can lead to procedural confounding due to hidden treatments. Previous studies on the effect of R&D funds on firms’ 
private investments in R&D and total innovation expenditure, not considering R&D tax credits and innovative public 
procurement as probable candidates for hidden treatment, could typically have incurred in this problem. We therefore 
suggested that the previous results might have been overestimated. 
 
In order to corroborate our hypothesis, we used data from the Innobarometer on "Strategic Trends in Innovation 
2006-2008",  a survey conducted with 5238 firms in the 27 member states of the EU, Norway, and Switzerland.  To 
evaluate the impact of each policy tool on firms’ innovative behaviour and to assess the existence  of a confounding 
effect, we designed ten quasi-experimental  treatments:  three of them do not consider possible policy simultaneity, 
other three of them consider the policy in isolation taking into account the issue of simultaneity,  and the latter four 
cases measure the effect of the policy mix. To reduce the selection bias that typically affects a quasi-experimental 
setting, we used the propensity score matching method. 
 
The results of the paper challenge the state of the art in the field and call for a deeper understanding   of the 
technology policy mix. In the first place, findings are coherent with the evidence in the previous literature only when 
we do not control for policies’ interactions; in this latter case, public subsidies positively  and significantly affect private 
effort on innovation activities, ruling out the crowding-out  effect hypothesis and confirming  the complementarity 
between public and private investment in innovation inputs. Moreover, as for subsidies, tax credits have a positive and 
significant  effect on the increase in total innovation expenditure. Innovative public procurement has a robust impact on 
private expenses in innovation activities. In terms of magnitude our results seem to confirm the theoretical hypothesis 
that innovative public procurement is more effective than R&D grants in stimulating private expenditure in innovation 
input (Geroski, 1990). Nevertheless, we should be aware that the dichotomous nature of our treatment variable renders 
a comparison very difficult, but it could be considered as preliminary evidence. 
When we consider the possible interactions of other policies,  the results show a different picture. The reinforcement 
effect of public support on private  innovation  efforts  ceases to be significant for firms exclusively participating in 
19 
 
 
subsidy programmes.  This is in line with the suggested existence of a procedural  confounding  effect produced by 
innovative public procurement as a hidden treatment.  This evidence casts serious doubts on the causal relationships 
found in earlier works, which should be reconsidered. We found a similar  outcome for the case of R&D tax credits 
which when controlling for other policies  have a much weaker impact. On the contrary, the same effect does not 
appear to work for innovative public procurement which, even when considered in isolation, still has a positive  and 
significant impact on innovative input, again coherently with Geroski (1990). 
We then analysed policy-mix possibilities.  The most interesting case is the contextual effect of both supply-side 
policies and innovative public procurement: the effect upon the increase in total innovation expenditure is significant 
and higher than the sum of the effects of the three policies considered in isolation.  This further corroborates the idea 
that a balance of the policies should be the best choice. 
 
From a policy point of view, this work contributes to the debate of supply vs. demand technology policies. Supply- 
side policies  reduce the cost of inventive activities, while demand-side ones increase the incentives  and reduce the 
uncertainty of the process of innovation. Whether one kind of policy outperforms the others is not an output of 
this paper.  The evidence undoubtedly  shows that supply-side policies  have been overestimated and that the role of 
innovative public procurement is not a mere theoretical hypothesis. Moreover, the preliminary evidence seems to point 
at a reinforcing  effect of the interaction among different tools in the technology policy mix. We carefully  suggest that 
innovative public procurement is not only able by itself to have a positive impact on firms’ innovative behaviour, but 
that it could also represents an effective way to reinforce potential positive effects of supply-side technology policies, 
stimulating additional private investments in R&D. However,  due to data constraints, the latter conclusion is based 
only on necessary conditions  and calls for more empirical evidence in the area. 
 
 
AppendixA. 
 
As we discussed in section 3.2, the question in the Innobarometer  survey that we use to build the treatment indica- 
tors Policy_Subsidies and Policy_Tax  Credits does not directly  ask whether a firm received subsidies or tax credits but 
only whether changes in these policies had a positive effect on innovation.  These treatment indicators should therefore 
be considered only as proxies  for the receipt of subsidies and tax credits. In order to check whether they are good 
proxies we confronted  our dataset with data retrieved from the Community Innovation Survey 2008 (CIS 8). The CIS 
8 survey presents two very helpful features to test the goodness of our indicators. In the first place it covers the very 
same time span of the Innobarometer  survey we use in our study, which is the period 2006-2008. Secondly it includes 
a question that specifically  ask whether a firm received R&D tax credits or subsidies. The latter feature enables us to 
build a variable that accurately reports the receipt of supply-side innovation policies at the firm level and to compare 
it with our proxy indicators. In particular we are interested in two elements. The first element of interest is whether 
there is a significant  difference in the share of firms receiving subsidies in the Innobarometer and CIS surveys. If we 
do not find such a difference  it could mean that the accurate and the noisy indicators are actually grasping the same 
information. To assess further the goodness of our proxy we then look at the distribution of the predicted probability of 
receiving subsidies given firm characteristics for the firms surveyed in the Innobarometer and the CIS survey. A high 
degree of overlapping  and similarity between the two distributions would once again confirm  the close relatedness 
between the accurate and the "noisy"  measure of the treatment. 
However, to make a meaningful  comparison several elements should be taken into account.  Firstly, the CIS 8 
question does not discriminate between tax credits and subsidies. Secondly, CIS data are available only for 14 countries 
21 . Third, the sampling performed for the two surveys did not necessarily target the very same groups of firms. It may 
be the case that one survey oversampled (undersampled)  a particular  sector or firm size category with respect to the 
other one. To solve the first problem, we create a variable for the CIS data that takes the value 1 if a firm received any of 
the two supply-side policies and 0 otherwise. We then build a variable that mimics the CIS one for the Innobarometer 
and takes the value 1 if either Policy_Subsidies or Policy_Tax Credits (as defined in section 3.2) is 1 and 0 otherwise 
and we call it the same name, policy_support.   Concerning the difference in the countries in the sample, we removed 
 
 
21 We have data for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia. Though available, we also excluded data for Norway and Ireland because the survey for those countries did not include the question about 
R&D subsidies. 
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from the Innobarometer  data the observations for the 15 countries for which we do not have a CIS counterpart and 
therefore the scope of this evaluation is limited to 14 out of the 29 countries included in the Innobarometer. The third 
problem, that is, the different sampling in terms of firms’ characteristics,  requires a more in-depth discussion.  For 
a proper comparison  of firms from the Innobarometer  dataset with firms from the CIS dataset, we should only look 
at companies that have the same probability  of being surveyed by one survey or the other. To accomplish this task, 
we exploit the fact that both surveys followed similar criteria in the sampling procedure since they both randomly 
selected firms within given stratifications built on the basis of three main characteristics of the firm: country of origin, 
activity  sector, and size. To avoid potential selection problems we therefore perform an exact matching on firms’ size, 
activity sector, and state and compare whether the share of firms receiving subsidies is different for firms surveyed by 
the Innobarometer Survey with respect to the CIS. Therefore, we vertically join together the two datasets and create a 
new variable, Innobar, taking the value 1 for firms surveyed in the Innobarometer survey and 0 for firms surveyed in 
the CIS survey, which we consider as a treatment variable.  We then implement exact matching on dummy variables 
for the country of origin of the firm, for the sector to which the firm belongs (NACE 2-digit aggregation level) and 
for its size22 . Table A.12 reports the average difference in participation  rates in subsidies programmes for firms in the 
Innobarometer and the CIS survey. As the table shows, after the matching implementation there is only a small and not 
statistically significant difference between the firms surveyed by the two datasets. This result reinforces the hypothesis 
that the "noisy"  treatment indicators recovered from the Innobarometer survey are indeed grasping information closely 
related to that collected by the more accurate indicator made available by the CIS. 
 
[Table 12 about here.] 
 
 
In order to explore the nature of this relationship further, we also look at the distribution  of the probability of receiv- 
ing subsidies conditional on firm characteristics for the matched firms. We run a probit regression of policy_support 
on size, country, and sectoral dummies for matched firms. We then compare the density distribution  of the predicted 
probability of receiving subsidies for firms in the Innobarometer survey and in the CIS survey. As figure A.7 shows 
there is a high-degree  of overlapping between the two distributions. This similarity again appears to confirm that both 
the accurate indicator,  used to build the variable policy_support for the CIS firms, and the noisy proxy, used to build 
policy_support for the Innobaromenter  firms, collect the same information. 
 
[Figure 7 about here.] 
 
 
Since the country for which the CIS data are available are mainly(10  out 14) Eastern European countries that have 
recently joined the European Union,  a possible concern could be that those states have specific characteristics  driving 
the previous result. This would be a major problem considering that the countries for which we are not able to make the 
comparison with the CIS data are mostly Western European states, long involved  in European integration  processes. 
In order to rule out this possibility, we replicated the procedure described above on a subsample composed only of 
Germany, Spain, Portugal and Italy.  Table A.13 reports the result. As in the previous  case there is no significant 
difference in participation  rates between firms surveyed in the Innobarometer  survey and those surveyed in the CIS 
8 survey. In A.8, we also reproduce the density distributions  of the predicted probability  of receiving subsidies and 
again the two distributions  present a high degree of overlapping. 
[Table 13 about here.] 
[Figure 8 about here.] 
 
 
22 In particular we create 3 dummies for small, medium and large enterprises. Small firms: 10 to 49 employees; Medium firms: 50-249; Large 
firms:250+. It should be noted that there is a difference in the definition of small firm in the Innobarometer and CIS survey. The former questionaire 
only targets firms with more than 20 employees, while the latter includes firm with as few as 10 employees or more. 
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Figure A.l:  Density distribution of the Predicted probability of receiving  innovation  subsidies for firrns surveyed in 
the Innobarometer  2009 and CIS 8 survey 
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Figure A.3: Distributions of the propensity score for the treated and the not-treated group before and after the matching 
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Figure A.4: Distributions of the propensity score for the treated and the not-treated group before and after the matching 
(cont.) 
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Figure A.5: Distributions of the propensity score for the treated and the not-treated group before and after the matching 
(cont.) 
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Figure A.7:  Density distribution of the Predicted probability of receiving innovation subsidies for firrns surveyed in 
the Innobarometer  2009 and CIS 8 survey 
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Figure A.8:  Density distribution of the Predicted probability of receiving  innovation  subsidies for firrns surveyed in 
the Innobarometer  2009 and CIS 8 survey for Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain 
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Table A.1: Treated firms 
 
 
Treatment 
 
Treated 
 
Control 
 
Description 
Treatment vulnerable to confounding    
 
Policy_Subsidies 
 
1108 
 
3723 
 
Firms receiving subsidies 
 
Policy_Procurement 
 
551 
 
4277 
 
Firms receiving innovative public procurement contracts 
 
Policy_Tax Credits 
 
1082 
 
3655 
 
Firms receiving tax credits 
Treatment in isolation    
 
Policy_Subsidies_only 
 
462 
 
2708 
 
Firms receiving only subsidies 
 
Policy_Procurement_only 
 
273 
 
2708 
 
Firms receiving only innovative public procurement contracts 
 
Policy_Tax credit_only 
 
483 
 
2708 
 
Firms receiving only tax credits 
Simultaneous treatments    
 
Policy_Sub_Tax 
 
403 
 
2708 
 
Firms receiving subsidies and tax credits 
 
Policy_Sub_IPP 
 
85 
 
2708 
 
Firms receiving subsidies and innovative public procurement 
 
Policy_IPP_Tax 
 
75 
 
2708 
 
Firms receiving innovative public procurement and tax credits 
 
Policy_All 
 
84 
 
2708 
 
Firms receiving all policies 
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Table A.2: Summary statistics 
 
  
mean 
 
sd 
 
count 
RD_ACT .455 .498 4992 
young_firm .081 .273 4992 
SIZE_1 .404 .490 4992 
SIZE_2 .323 .467 4992 
SIZE_3 .175 .380 4992 
SIZE_4 .096 .295 4992 
mkt_regional .904 .293 4982 
mkt_national .669 .470 4980 
mkt_eu .440 .496 4978 
mkt_global .308 .462 4972 
37 
 
 
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variables 
Not treated Subsidies Not treated Procurement Not treated Tax credits 
RD_ACT .421 .564 .430 .638 .430 .522 
young_firm .079 .086 .081 .083 .077 .092 
SIZE_1 .418 .369 .418 .343 .411 .397 
SIZE_2 .321 .336 .321 .313 .328 .313 
SIZE_3 .168 .187 .171 .190 .170 .184 
SIZE_4 .091 .106 .089 .152 .090 .104 
mkt_regional .901 .913 .900 .934 .904 .903 
mkt_national .662 .688 .654 .774 .654 .708 
mkt_eu .432 .459 .436 .472 .427 .468 
mkt_global .301 .325 .301 .342 .294 .335 
INNO_INCREASE .373 .477 .377 .544 .370 .487 
N 3723 1108 4277 551 3655 1082 
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Table A.4: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable 
Not treated Subsidies_only Procurement_only Tax credits_only Sub_Tax IPP_Tax Sub_IPP All 
RD_ACT .395 .502 .597 .432 .560 .666 .623 .714 
young_firm .077 .075 .069 .093 .091 .133 .117 .059 
SIZE_1 .430 .359 .340 .432 .387 .293 .364 .452 
SIZE_2 .322 .352 .318 .287 .339 .346 .317 .250 
SIZE_3 .166 .181 .168 .182 .178 .200 .247 .154 
SIZE_4 .080 .106 .172 .097 .094 .160 .070 .142 
mkt_regional .898 .917 .930 .893 .898 .960 .929 .928 
mkt_national .640 .652 .761 .694 .684 .800 .670 .833 
mkt_eu .427 .415 .426 .452 .470 .493 .447 .523 
mkt_global .289 .280 .318 .339 .325 .337 .309 .369 
INNO_INCREASE .346 .404 .454 .426 .476 .666 .600 .642 
N 2708 462 273 483 403 75 85 84 
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Table A.5: Probit regression results 
 
 (1) 
Policy_Subsidies 
(2) 
Policy_Tax Credits 
(3) 
Policy_Procurement 
 
RD_ACT 
 
0.377∗∗∗ 
 
0.234∗∗∗ 
 
0.413∗∗∗ 
SIZE_2 0.0362 -0.0687 0.0262 
SIZE_3 0.0545 0.00704 0.0595 
SIZE_4 0.0701 0.00649 0.292∗∗∗ 
mkt_regional 0.0523 0.0223 0.202∗∗ 
mkt_national 0.0158 0.108∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 
mkt_eu 0.0500 -0.0108 -0.0498 
mkt_global -0.0469 0.0804 -0.0355 
young_firm 0.0584 0.0521 -0.00963 
Sectoral dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -0.798∗∗∗ -0.922∗∗∗ -1.706∗∗∗ 
∗  p < 0.10,  ∗∗ p < 0.05,  ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
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Table A.6: Multinomial logit results 
 
 1 
Subsidies_Only 
2 
Procurement_Only 
3 
Tax_Only 
4 
Policy_All 
5 
Tax_IPP 
6 
Subsidies_IPP 
7 
Subsidies_Tax 
RD_ACT 0.390∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.132 0.704∗∗∗ 1.009∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.345∗∗∗ 
SIZE_2 0.214∗ 0.105 -0.182 -0.0272 0.365 -0.0714 -0.755∗∗ 
SIZE_3 0.172 0.0956 0.0130 0.0171 0.383 0.350 -0.494 
SIZE_4 0.422∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ -0.0751 0.0288 0.725∗ -0.243 0.0140 
mkt_regional 0.0708 0.241 0.00266 -0.0204 1.169 0.384 0.321 
mkt_national 0.0642 0.361∗∗ 0.224∗ 0.0148 0.756∗∗ -0.255 0.723∗∗ 
mkt_eu -0.132 -0.383∗∗ -0.250∗ 0.0628 -0.141 0.215 0.197 
mkt_global -0.100 -0.0947 0.383∗∗∗ 0.00189 -0.192 -0.0882 -0.00446 
young_firm 0.0438 -0.122 0.113 0.125 0.547 0.396 -0.471 
Sectoral dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -1.719∗∗∗ -2.990∗∗∗ -2.613∗∗∗ -1.702∗∗∗ -6.468∗∗∗ -5.698∗∗∗ -3.791∗∗∗ 
 
∗  p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 
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Table A.7: Loss of observations due to common support and caliper requirement 
 
 
Treatment vulnerable to confounding 
Treated group Control group Loss to common support & Caliper (%) 
 
Policy_Subsidies 1108 3723 15 (1.35) 
Policy_Procurement  551 4277  8 (1.45) 
Policy_Tax Credits 1082 3655 11 (1.01) 
 
Treatment in isolation 
 
Policy_Subsidies_only 462 2708 8 (1.73) 
Policy_Procurement_only 273 2708 6 (2.19) 
Policy_Tax credit_only 483 2708 10 (2.07) 
 
Simultaneous treatments 
 
Policy_Sub_Tax                                       403                 2708                                8 (1.98) 
Policy_Sub_IPP                                       85                  2708                                6 (7.05) 
Policy_IPP_Tax                                        75                  2708                                1 (1.33) 
Policy_All                                                  84                  2708                                6 (7.14) 
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Table A.8: Balance 
 
 
Treatment Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p chi2 MeanBias MedBias 
 
 
Policy_Subsidies 
 
Raw 
 
0.056 
 
287.08 
 
0.000 
 
4.9 
 
4.2 
 Matched 0.004 13.58 1.000 1.4 1.5 
 
Policy_Procurement 
 
Raw 
 
0.087 
 
293.85 
 
0.000 
 
7.0 
 
4.7 
 Matched 0.009 13.64 1.000 2.1 1.8 
 
Policy_Tax Credits 
 
Raw 
 
0.056 
 
283.65 
 
0.000 
 
5.4 
 
3.9 
 Matched 0.004 12.77 1.000 1.5 1.2 
 
Policy_Subsidies_only 
 
Raw 
 
0.062 
 
161.66 
 
0.000 
 
5.9 
 
5.2 
 Matched 0.018 23.21 1.000 2.8 2.3 
 
Policy_Procurement_only 
 
Raw 
 
0.099 
 
177.45 
 
0.000 
 
8.5 
 
7.2 
 Matched 0.019 13.74 1.000 3.0 1.8 
 
Policy_Tax credit_only 
 
Raw 
 
0.064 
 
172.37 
 
0.000 
 
5.6 
 
4.2 
 Matched 0.018 24.03 1.000 2.8 2.4 
 
Policy_Sub_Tax 
 
Raw 
 
0.089 
 
210.54 
 
0.000 
 
7.4 
 
6.2 
 Matched 0.022 23.90 1.000 3.1 2.0 
 
Policy_Sub_IPP 
 
Raw 
 
0.134 
 
93.80 
 
0.000 
 
11.8 
 
10.6 
 Matched 0.063 13.87 1.000 4.4 2.7 
 
Policy_IPP_Tax 
 
Raw 
 
0.122 
 
76.10 
 
0.020 
 
12.8 
 
9.1 
 Matched 0.051 10.38 1.000 3.9 2.8 
 
Policy_All 
 
Raw 
 
0.168 
 
120.63 
 
0.000 
 
12.4 
 
9.0 
 Matched 0.051 10.98 1.000 4.6 3.8 
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Table A.9: Results 
 
Policy Sample Treated Controls Difference  S.E. T-stat 
 
 
Policy_Subsidies 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4777 
 
.3736 
 
.1040*** 
 
.0167 
 
6.21 
 ATT .4784 .4004 .0780*** .0201 3.88 
 
Policy_Procurement 
 
Unmatched 
 
.5457 
 
.3775 
 
.1682*** 
 
.0221 
 
7.61 
 ATT .5488 .4358 .1129*** .0270 4.17 
 
Policy_Tax Credits 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4883 
 
.3712 
 
.1170*** 
 
.0169 
 
6.91 
 ATT .4892 .3879 .1013*** .0206 4.91 
 
Policy_Subsidies_only 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4026 
 
.3473 
 
.0552** 
 
.0242 
 
2.28 
 ATT .4008 .3715 .0293 .0292 1.00 
 
Policy_Procurement_only 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4522 
 
.3473 
 
.1048*** 
 
.0304 
 
3.44 
 ATT .4494 .3645 .0848** .0377 2.25 
 
Policy_Tax credit_only 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4276 
 
.3473 
 
.0802*** 
 
.0238 
 
3.37 
 ATT .4270 .3735 .0535* .0289 1.85 
 
Policy_Sub_Tax 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4763 
 
.3473 
 
.1289*** 
 
.0256 
 
5.02 
 ATT .4759 .3822 .0936*** .0318 2.94 
 
Policy_Sub_IPP 
 
Unmatched 
 
.61445 
 
.3473 
 
.26706*** 
 
.05312 
 
5.03 
 ATT .6075 .3881 .21940*** .06679 3.28 
 
Policy_IPP_Tax 
 
Unmatched 
 
.6621 
 
.3473 
 
.3147*** 
 
.05611 
 
5.61 
 ATT .6621 .3738 .2882*** .0673 4.28 
 
Policy_All Unmatched 
 
.6428 
 
.3473 
 
.2954*** 
 
.0527 
 
5.60 
ATT .6410 .3376 .3034*** .0661 4.59 
* , ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Table A.10: Results obtained using the nearest neighbor procedure with only 1 neighbor 
 
Policy Sample Treated Controls Difference  S.E. T-stat 
 
 
Policy_Subsidies 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4777 
 
.3736 
 
.1040*** 
 
.0167 
 
6.21 
 ATT .4784 .3858 .0926*** .0228 4.05 
 
Policy_Procurement 
 
Unmatched 
 
.5457 
 
.3775 
 
.1682*** 
 
.0221 
 
7.61 
 ATT .5488 .4358 .1129*** .0270 4.17 
 
Policy_Tax Credits 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4883 
 
.3712 
 
.1170*** 
 
.0169 
 
6.91 
 ATT .4892 .3678 .1213*** .023 5.16 
 
Policy_Subsidies_only 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4026 
 
.3473 
 
.0552** 
 
.0242 
 
2.28 
 ATT .4008 .3810 .0197 .0344 0.57 
 
Policy_Procurement_only 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4522 
 
.3473 
 
.1048*** 
 
.0304 
 
3.44 
 ATT .4494 .3592 .0901** .0436 2.07 
 
Policy_Tax credit_only 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4276 
 
.3473 
 
.0802*** 
 
.0238 
 
3.37 
 ATT .4270 .3792 .0478 .03343 1.43 
 
Policy_Sub_Tax 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4763 
 
.3473 
 
.1289*** 
 
.0256 
 
5.02 
 ATT .47597 .3370 .1388*** .0361 3.84 
 
Policy_Sub_IPP 
 
Unmatched 
 
.61445 
 
.3473 
 
.26706*** 
 
.05312 
 
5.03 
 ATT .6075 .4396 .1679** .0787 2.13 
 
Policy_IPP_Tax 
 
Unmatched 
 
.6621 
 
.3473 
 
.3147*** 
 
.05611 
 
5.61 
 ATT .66216 .4621 .2000** .08257 2.42 
 
Policy_All Unmatched 
 
.6428 
 
.3473 
 
.2954*** 
 
.0527 
 
5.60 
ATT .6410 .35961 .2813*** .0757 3.71 
* , ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Table A.11: Results obtained using kernel matching procedure 
 
Policy Sample Treated Controls Difference  S.E. T-stat 
 
 
Policy_Subsidies 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4777 
 
.3736 
 
.1040*** 
 
.0167 
 
6.21 
 ATT .4781 .3952 .0828*** .0243 3.40 
 
Policy_Procurement 
 
Unmatched 
 
.5457 
 
.3775 
 
.1682*** 
 
.0221 
 
7.61 
 ATT .54576 .3901 .1556*** .0324 4.80 
 
Policy_Tax Credits 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4883 
 
.3712 
 
.1170*** 
 
.0169 
 
6.91 
 ATT .4883 .3606 .1276*** .0251 5.08 
 
Policy_Subsidies_only 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4026 
 
.3473 
 
.0552** 
 
.0242 
 
2.28 
 ATT .4026 .3785 .0240 .0360 0.67 
 
Policy_Procurement_only 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4522 
 
.3473 
 
.1048*** 
 
.0304 
 
3.44 
 ATT .4522 .3676 .0845* .0452 1.87 
 
Policy_Tax credit_only 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4276 
 
.3473 
 
.0802*** 
 
.0238 
 
3.37 
 ATT .4285 .3613 .0672* .0355 1.89 
 
Policy_Sub_Tax 
 
Unmatched 
 
.4763 
 
.3473 
 
.1289*** 
 
.0256 
 
5.02 
 ATT .4735 .3682 .1052*** .0275 3.83 
 
Policy_Sub_IPP 
 
Unmatched 
 
.61445 
 
.3473 
 
.26706*** 
 
.05312 
 
5.03 
 ATT .6075 .3709 .2366*** .0565 4.18 
 
Policy_IPP_Tax 
 
Unmatched 
 
.6621 
 
.3473 
 
.3147*** 
 
.05611 
 
5.61 
 ATT .6621 .3767 .2854*** .0569 5.01 
 
Policy_All Unmatched 
 
.6428 
 
.3473 
 
.2954*** 
 
.0527 
 
5.60 
ATT .6410 .3926 .2483*** .0560 4.43 
* , ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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Table A.12: Difference in the participation rate in subsidies program for Inuobarometer  and CIS 8 firms 
 
Sample Innobarometer CIS 8 Di:fference S.E. T-stat 
Unmatched  .351921275  .218906998 .133014276*** .009247069  14.38 
     Matched  .34439834  .294605809  .049792531  .041094489  1.21   
 
* , ** and *** denote significance at the 10%,5% and l% level 
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Table A.13: Difference in the participation  rate in subsidies program for Innobarometer and CIS 8 firms, for Germany, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal 
 
Sample Innobarometer CIS 8 Difference S.E. T-stat 
Unmatched .323489933 .222461757 .101028176*** .015448447 6.54 
Matched .304093567 .328947368 -.024853801 .044974859 -0.55 
 
* , ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
